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Abstract 
 
Promoting compliance is at the heart of Australia’s tax regime management. Many factors 
affect compliance levels and practices, which can be grouped as individual, political, 
economic and social factors, set within the contextual facets of ‘globalisation’. How these 
affective factors are epistemologically framed should also be considered central to tax 
compliance and its research. This paper departs from prevailing positivist approaches, 
arguing there is now room in compliance research to take a more ‘post-modern’ 
perspective. This is possible on two fronts. First, there are new compliance tools, such as 
the Australian Tax Office’s Compliance Model (ATO Compliance Model), that embraces 
some of the tenets of modern social theory by encouraging dialogue, empathy and positive 
change. Second, qualitative research methods present grounded, in-depth and positioned 
research, and are able to locate ‘intangibilities’ missing from other research perspectives. 
Drawing these two strands together, this paper discusses qualitative research carried out 
into the experiences and perceptions of the ATO Compliance Model ‘champions’ in the 
Australian Taxation Office. It illustrates how effective both the ATO Compliance Model is 
in promoting deep-seated attitudinal and practice change in champions, and also how 
qualitative methods can look ‘below the line’ of usual compliance markers to grasp the 
subtleties of change. In sum, this paper argues that a ‘post-modern’ approach does indeed 
have a place in tax research today. 
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Financing Australia: A ‘post-modern’ approach to tax compliance and tax research 
Kersty Hobson 
 
Introduction 
 
In a recent paper that outlines possible avenues for future tax research, Tomkins, Packman, 
Russell & Colville (2001, p. 751) argue that ‘effective tax regime management lies at the 
heart of public spending policies’. The rationale behind this assertion is obvious—if 
revenue for public spending is not collected efficiently and sustainably, public policy 
initiatives will not be well financed. The authors go on to point out that, to date, much tax 
research has considered tax system management to be about the administration of high-
level fiscal policies (see also Brewer, 2001). However, they argue, tax system management 
concerns a much broader range of concerns. For one, it concerns the creation and 
maintenance of compliant behaviour amongst individuals and groups within a tax system. 
And as such, this area of research is sorely lacking in fresh insight. 
 
Yet, the topic of compliance underpins the work of the Centre for Tax System Integrity 
(CTSI) at the Australian National University. CTSI was established in August 1999 as a 
research partnership between the Australian National University and the Australian 
Taxation Office (Tax Office). It aims to understand how and why cooperation and 
contestation occurs within the tax system by examining the values, attitudes and 
behaviours of tax officers, taxpayers, tax agents and beneficiaries of the tax system. With 
the overall goal of improving the integrity of the tax system, questions of compliance 
management strategies and processes are central. 
 
This paper reports on one small part of CTSI’s compliance research, focussing specifically 
on the Australian Taxation Office Compliance Model (ATO Compliance Model) 
developed in conjunction with the Tax Office and ‘rolled out’ through the organisation 
since 1998 (see Australian Tax Office, 1998). This Model aims to increase the incidence of 
compliant tax practices in the Australian public by encouraging the Tax Office to rethink 
its products and processes. Through examining central tenets of the ATO Compliance 
Model, and using some contemporary social theory to analyse research findings, this paper 
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presents a way of thinking about tax compliance that challenges some of the prevailing 
epistemological norms and assumptions often made in tax research in reference to how we 
understand and promote tax compliance. In short, it argues that by examining initiatives 
such as the ATO Compliance Model from a more ‘post-modern’ perspective, a fresh 
contribution can be made to researching tax systems, tax administration and taxpayer 
behaviour.   
 
Tax Compliance: Why is it important and what factors help shape it? 
 
Few arenas of modern governance impose more difficult problems of trust than the 
collection of income taxes. The incentives to cheat on taxes are immediate, 
concrete, and potentially quite large, while the public goods produced from tax 
revenues provide diffuse benefits that are often difficult to evaluate and are 
available whether or not one pays taxes (Scholz, 1998, p. 139). 
 
In Australia, the majority of tax revenue is individual income tax. This is assessed annually 
when individuals lodge a statement of earnings in the form of an annual income tax return. 
As reporting is voluntary, individual tax compliance is a pressing fiscal and political issue, 
as the above quote suggests. Although estimates of how much is lost per annum in non-
compliant behaviour are broad at best (see Wickerson, 1994), there is deemed to be a 
significant amount missing from the ‘public purse’ (for example, Blumenthal, Christian & 
Slemrod, 2001). It appears that everyone wants good schools, roads and hospitals, yet 
many individuals and businesses—either through intentional and direct evasion in the form 
of ‘creative compliance’ (McBarnet, 2001) or because of inadequate information—are not 
putting their ‘fair share’ into this purse. 
 
This is not a new problem. As long as there have been tax systems to finance state policies, 
tax compliance and evasion has been a public fiscal issue (Smith, 1993). However, it is 
arguable that today there exist specific social, political and economic conditions that make 
compliance management a more pressing concern. Returning to Tomkins et al., (2001), 
they outline some contemporary factors that may shape and impact upon individual and 
business compliance behaviour, which are most relevant to countries with market 
economies and pluralistic democracies. 
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For one, there are political factors. These include the influence of government, such as the 
current neo-liberal administrations of Australia, the US and UK, where cuts in public 
sector spending now mean government departments are ‘doing more with less’ dollars or 
pounds (for example, Jenkins, 1995; Haylett, 2001). This can result in systems of tax 
evasion monitoring, with tax offices themselves becoming under-funded, making it even 
harder to administer complex tax laws. Such ideological and fiscal trends are viewed as 
part of ‘globalisation’, a hotly debated phenomenon that has complex and far-reaching 
implications for future modes of effective national governance (Peters & Pierre, 1998; see 
also Karkkainen, Fung & Sabel, 2000). This trend includes increased international trade 
and subsequent changes in business structures and processes, ushered in by advanced 
technological systems such as e-commerce. Together, these are arguably causing rapid 
change to international business governance structures and practices (Watanabe, 2000)1. 
 
Tomkins et al., (2001, p. 754) also state that ‘social factors’ feed into higher levels of non-
compliance, as ‘increased globalisation can only add to the temptation to act unethically’. 
This assertion is made mainly from a business perspective, where, as stated above, access 
to international market and tax-minimising investment opportunities may promote a 
‘culture’ of, and more opportunities for, tax evasion. What about the individual? How do 
‘social factors’ relate to us all and how do they affect personal compliance behaviour? In 
light of these questions, there is a need to look more closely at how contemporary social 
factors may affect tax compliance. In Australia for example, research has outlined how 
many individuals report feeling that social conditions are rapidly changing for the worse. 
There is evidence of declining public confidence in government (Ryan, 2001), along with 
feelings that quality of life is decreasing (Eckersley, 2001). There is also a creeping 
political cynicism that sees tax as a political ‘football’ (Randall, 2001) to which individuals 
express feelings of ambiguous commitment (Braithwaite, Reinhart, Mearns & Graham, 
2001). In this climate, asking questions about individual tax compliance from a social 
perspective is timely. This paper thus examines some potential approaches to this task, 
                                                 
1 See also Nash (2000) for theoretical discussion; Welch & Wong (2001) for an international comparative 
administration perspective; and Coleman & Freeman (1997) for an Australian Small Business perspective. 
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considering ways that effective social factors can be framed and can inform approaches to 
tax compliance. 
 
Researching tax compliance: Time for a new approach? 
 
There is no doubt that we live in a world very different from 50, even 20 years ago. A vast 
literature now exists on the phenomenon of globalisation, whereby technology has made 
the world a smaller, more accessible and information-rich place (for some people). 
Discussing the characteristics and competing definitions of globalisation and recent socio-
structural changes is beyond the ambit of this paper (see Nash, 2000), yet it is important to 
note that it is often differentially framed as an economic, ideological or social/cultural 
phenomenon. These differences are not trivial. They represent a range of theoretical ‘tool-
kits’ that can be used when considering how current social factors feed into compliance 
behaviour. 
 
For example, the majority of tax compliance research to date has been conducted using 
positivist epistemologies of social psychology, economics (Kirchler & Maciejovsky, 2001; 
Schmidt, 2001; Webley, Cole & Eidjar, 2001) and law (Cooper & Cunliffe, 2001; Pagone, 
2000, 2001). This work might frame globalisation as offering increased opportunities for 
individuals and businesses to ‘cheat’ in social dilemma scenarios. Or, it might examine 
how individual’s personality variables correlate with global social factors that shape 
compliance behaviour. Although in total this approach presents a body of work that is vast 
and impressive in scope and findings, it has its limitations. For one, correlating personality 
or social variables with individual (non) compliance often provides little information about 
cause and effect, and links between these variables (Taylor, 2001). Also, treating human 
behaviour as a mathematically predictable entity has severe limitations (Visser, 2000). For 
instance, the assertion that individuals are utility maximising actors located within 
determinant social and organisational structures (for example, Brewer, 2001; Sanyal, Gang 
& Goswami, 2000; Vehron & Brondolo, 1999)—one of the theoretical linchpins of 
economic theory—has increasingly been criticised as an unproductive research heuristic 
(Billig, 1987; Boden, 1994; Coleman & Freeman, 1997; Jones, 2001; Shotter, 1993).  
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What are the alternatives? Researchers working in the field of organisational change, 
public administration and social policy have called for the academy to adopt more critical 
approaches to research (Welford, 1998). They argue that prevailing epistemologies often 
replicate dominant forms of knowledge (Taylor, 1998; Welford, 1998) and power (Fox, 
2000; Triantafillou & Nielsen, 2001), whose uncritical acceptance obscures key relations, 
networks and discourses from scrutiny. Heeding this call, this paper argues that taking a 
more socially embedded perspective on tax compliance opens up a research agenda that 
aims to interrogate the political and social dimensions of compliance behaviour. Often, 
research locates sites or levels of non-compliance, such as within a particular group or in a 
population as a whole, and looks at how public or private factors might feed into this 
behaviour (for example, Australian Taxation Office, 1998; Cuccia & Carnes, 2001). By 
contrast, critical social research takes the individual and their sociality as the starting point 
of research. Through examining the social processes that form and maintain individual 
practices, one of which is tax compliance behaviour. As Coleman and Freeman (1997, p. 
318) put it: 
 
A behavioural approach looks at the individual as a whole person operating in a 
specific environment, not just a (small business) taxpayer who is engaging in non-
compliant behaviour, quietly maximising personal advantage and indifferent to the 
meanings of age, gender, class, lifestyle, time and place. 
 
Although the relationship between critical social theory and the day-to-day administration 
of a tax system may seem incongruous, on closer inspection it appears that they have a lot 
to offer each other (see Taylor, 1998). First, by taking a more agency-focussed perspective 
on regulation, the ATO Compliance Model will be shown here to have a great deal in 
common with some of the central tenets of modern social theory. In this way, the ATO 
Compliance Model can be viewed as a ‘post-modern’ regulatory tool. Second, through 
employing some of the heuristic tools and research methods of contemporary social 
research, a particular story can be told about how initiatives such as the ATO Compliance 
Model work, both within the Tax Office and within some part of the Australian taxpaying 
population. As such, this provides evidence and verification that approaches to regulation 
such as the ATO Compliance Model have a legitimate place in a suite of tax compliance 
approaches. 
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The ATO Compliance Model: a way of understanding and improving tax regime 
management 
 
It is by no means the case that simply ‘more audits’ will be the appropriate initiative 
by the ATO for improving compliance over the long-term. Instead … the 
appropriate main response might well be some form of taxpayer education 
(Wickerson, 1994, p. 23). 
 
Since its inception, the Tax Office has predominantly been an organisation with an ethos of 
command and control. This is not surprising, as the pubic service is institutionally risk-
averse, being subject to many checks and balances and also to politician’s watchful gazes 
(see Williams, 2001). Yet, it is not a static organisation. Like most public service 
departments its administrative rationale has been exposed over the decades to the whims of 
fluctuating political ideology. For example, the neo-liberal marketisation of the public 
sector and construction of ‘citizens as consumers’ in the 1980s and 1990s brought with it 
vast organisation changes and a prevailing discourse of service and efficiency (Ryan, 2001; 
Jenkins, 1995). This discourse in turn has been partially eclipsed or amended by new or 
‘third way’ forms of governance that emphasise partnership and cooperation (Ryan, 2001) 
wherein the ‘process is the product’ (Eckersley, 2001; Hubbard, 2001). Added to this, the 
‘knowledge-society’ requires organisations to strive for improvement through constant 
innovation and learning via information sharing (Ali, 2001), producing a form of public 
administration that focuses on both efficiency and responsiveness (see Peters & Pierre, 
1998; Welch & Wong, 2001 for further explanation)2.  
 
This approach is partially reflected in the introduction of the Australian Taxation Office 
Taxpayers’ Charter and the Public Service Code of Conduct. Yet, the question still remains 
as to how the Tax Office is to work towards achieving greater tax compliance within these 
                                                 
2 This has been labelled New Public Management (NPM). However, it should be noted that NPM does not 
present a unified form of administrative theory. Rather, it encapsulates a sweep of reforms that both free-up 
managers to act creatively whilst ‘corporatising’ public services and thus increasing the emphasis on 
efficiency and returns (see Nash, 2000, Peters & Pierre, 1998). Hence, there are implicit tensions within this 
administration diagnosis that straddle post-modernism to traditional Weberian forms of public bureaucracy. 
How these forces can exist side-by-side can perhaps be understood if we consider the sites of NPM. For 
example, one possible explanation of this tension is that this move from hierarchy to heterachy is mainly an 
experience of management (for example, see Hinchliffe, 2000). By contrast, strong hierarchy and set 
procedures prevail for general staff, which appears to be the case in some business lines in reference to the 
Compliance Model, and has also been found in other research (for example, Hobson, 1999). 
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rapidly changing social and business climates. In line with Wickerson’s above quote, 
researchers at the Australian National University argue that promoting tax compliance 
behaviour in Australia necessitates the Tax Office understanding the many factors that 
affect taxpayer behaviour. For one, there has to be a consideration of taxpayer motivations. 
Braithwaite (forthcoming) has labelled these ‘motivational postures’, which are the 
attitudes that individuals bring to interactions with the Tax Office, shaping how they react 
to, and interact with, the tax regime. These postures sit within a wide array of business, 
industry, social, economic and psychological (or ‘BISEP’) factors that mediate individual 
postures. Together, these factors and postures cannot be understood and addressed with a 
limited array of regime management tools. Instead, they require regulatory strategies that 
consist of an incremental set of sanctions, which take into account the individual’s 
positioning in relation to tax.  
 
Ayres and Braithwaite’s (1992) pyramid of regulatory strategies suggests there are four 
forms of regulatory strategies—self-regulation, enforced self-regulation, command 
regulation with discretionary punishment, and command regulation with non-discretionary 
punishment. As any regulator’s preferred strategy is individual self-regulation, it is argued 
that organisations such as the Tax Office would benefit from helping taxpayers form this 
type of practice. For example, rather than focussing on auditing and prosecution, the Tax 
Office should in the first instance focus on increasing voluntary compliance through 
education, convenience and efficient service delivery (Australian Taxation Office, 1998). 
This approach is pertinent as research is increasingly showing how prosecuting taxpayers 
or simply sending out terse letters does not substantially increase lodgment over time 
(Blumenthal et al., 2001; Levi, 1998; Wenzel, 2001). 
 
Overall, this requires the Tax Office develop a more holistic approach to tax regime 
management (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Levi, 1998), an argument which has been 
translated into the ATO Compliance Model, developed and adopted within the Tax Office 
in 1997 as part of a ‘Cash Economy’ project (see Shover, Job & Carroll, 2001 for further  
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history). Figure 1 outlines the ATO Compliance Model and illustrates how it combines the 
different motivational postures of taxpayers with potential regulatory and enforcement 
strategies by the Tax Office. The aim is to help Tax Office officers help taxpayers position 
themselves and stay at the bottom of the pyramid, without excluding the tools of 
prosecution and audit from the Tax Office tool-kit where appropriate. 
 
This approach presents a significant departure for the Tax Office, in terms of its impacts on 
both their products and processes. First, a product is a good or service offered to a client 
(Damapour & Gopalakrishnan, 2001). To encourage greater compliance rather than 
promoting fear of getting caught out, Tax Office product emphasis is now on education 
and taxpayer skills rather than auditing. One example of this can be seen in the 
introduction of ‘Real Time Reviews’. This is where tax officers examine taxpayer’s 
personal or business records and activities  in order to assess their book keeping skills and 
to educate individuals if there are any errors. Through this practice, tax officers are also 
able to gain further insight into taxpayers’ circumstances and behaviour (see Shover et al., 
2001), making it a two-way learning experience. Second, Tax Office processes are 
implicated, as the Model necessitates a change of attitude in terms of how Tax Office staff 
undertake their work and see their role in forwarding improved tax compliance. Tax 
officers are now called upon to think more broadly, being aware of how their professional 
behaviour and attitudes towards a client affects future compliance outcomes. In short, they 
have to begin to act from the belief that the majority of taxpayers want to do the ‘right 
thing’ and that a negative experience with the Tax Office might cause individuals to resent 
the Tax Office, doing all they can in the future to ‘get even’ (Coleman & Freeman, 1997). 
Providing help and understanding enables them to achieve the goals of increasing 
compliance and revenue. 
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Figure 1: The ATO Compliance Model (from Shover et al., 2001) 
 
In this way, the Model is not an innovation that is superimposed onto the Tax Office but is 
rather one that infiltrates many Tax Office practices. And it is this difference, outlined in 
the following section, which opens up the opportunity to examine compliance and tax 
systems from a critical social perspective. That is, in reference to Tomkin et al.’s (2001) 
assertion that processes and outcomes of globalisation may affect compliance behaviour, it 
is argued here that the ethics and practices of the ATO Compliance Model coincides with 
one particular take on modern social life, as it approaches the issue from the individual, not 
a systems perspective. As such, it has the potential to increase, and indeed has increased, 
tax compliance through harnessing some of the ‘tools’ or features of post-modernity. 
 
Diagnosing social life: The ATO Compliance Model as a post-modern tax tool? 
 
This paper takes a pragmatic and positive approach by viewing ‘theories as instruments for 
transforming reality, rather than having the role of mirroring its essential and invariant  
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features’ (Bogason, 2001, p. 180). As such, it aims to show how the ATO Compliance 
Model (potentially) shifts Tax Office thinking about taxpayers from a ‘homo economis’, to 
a more dialogic and iterative perspective on tax compliance, governance and public 
administration. This brings the ATO Compliance Model into the realms of some aspects of 
modern social theory, making it a ‘post-modern tax tool’. 
 
To explain this point further it is necessary to outline some current social or post-modern 
theories that seek to diagnose common trends and experiences in high-income societies3. 
These theories are essentially anti-reductionist (Sibeon, 1999). They aim to move away 
from ‘grand theories or narratives’ such as structuralism and functionalism, which mapped 
out immutable social structures that individuals then simply slot into. By contrast, critical 
social theory argues that to investigate how individuals think and behave, it is necessary to 
address values, beliefs and cultural assumptions, and how they relate to cultural meanings 
(Coleman & Freeman, 1997; Reser, 1995). This in turn requires an understanding of the 
broad social contexts or community of the individual actor (Burningham & Cooper, 1999). 
For the sake of this paper, there are two key components to these approaches. First, the 
diagnosis offered of the conditions of modern social life. Second, how these conditions are 
believed to influence individual practices. Both these components will be discussed briefly 
below. 
 
To begin with the diagnosis of modern social life, one well-rehearsed framing is the notion 
of the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992, 1995). Beck and others have argued extensively that 
current social conditions in high-incomes countries, with a prevalence of environmental 
and economic risks and uncertainties, has caused a breaking down of old social patterns. 
Focussing on how this affects the individual, Beck argues that as information is available 
about a proliferation of risks and inequalities (for example, BSE, Radon gas, pesticides, 
multi-millionaires paying next-to-no tax, and so on) individuals experience new forms of 
                                                 
3 The term ‘postmodern’ is subject to a great deal of critical debate in the academy. Much work has been 
done in this area to date (see Nash, 2000) but the space does not exist within this paper to argue about 
conflicting definitions. Briefly however, as Bogason (2001, p. 166) states, ‘Most social scientists agree that 
we are witnessing changes in society and in the ontology and epistemology of the social sciences, but they 
differ in their ways of expressing the changes’. Therefore, the phrase is used here as convenient shorthand to 
represent one theme or collection of arguments that have come to the fore in the critical social sciences, 
sharing similar concepts and framing contemporary social conditions through similar diagnostics. 
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both social anxiety and liberation. This creates widespread questioning of the authority of 
once dominant institutions and forms of knowledge, creating contestation of prevailing 
dogma and vested interests (Eckersley, 2001, Peters & Pierre, 1998). This state is often 
labelled ‘reflexive modernisation’, where: 
 
People have been set free from conventionalised forms of life. Roles, relationships 
and practices no longer constitute the self as once they might; they are confronted 
by the self as something external to it, as options to be chosen, rejected or adapted 
(Szerszynski, 1999, p. 245). 
 
In short, a process of individualisation has taken place. This is not to be read as isolation 
and alienation (Beck, 1998)4. Rather, individuals are embedded within the socio-material 
trends of economic and cultural globalisation, which means: ‘The narrative of self-identity 
has to be shaped, altered and reflexively sustained in relation to rapidly changing 
circumstances of social life, on a local and global scale’ (Giddens, 1991, p. 215). Thus, 
individual financial practices can be viewed as part of a globalised state of reflexive 
modernisation. Here, government’s and the public service’s authority and ‘expert 
knowledge’ is diminished, making their rationale, actions and discourses subject to public 
and private scrutiny , and also making trust a key issue in governance (see Braithwaite, 
1998; Hardin, 1998; Newton, 2001; Scholz & Lubell, 1998). 
 
This type of diagnosis sits alongside and feeds into advances in social theory in many 
ways, including our understanding of how social behaviour and processes are created and 
maintained. For example, Giddens’ structuration theory posits that in this state and time, 
social practices and institutions that often appear as ‘systems’ when glanced at 
momentarily (for example, Giddens, 1984), are rather constantly (re) created ways of  
 
                                                 
4 Although, there are strong arguments that Beck and Giddens’ rather optimistic diagnosis ignores how 
benefits of post-modernity are vastly uneven in their class and geographical distribution. For example, there 
is mounting evidence that the gap between rich and poor has widened over the past few decades in countries 
such as Australia and UK. This leads to greater social alienation and disenfranchisement of the poor in 
consumer-orientated societies. 
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acting and thinking that form the conditions for future actions5. In this way, individual tax 
compliance behaviour is not a social given but a practice affected by, and effecting, social 
interactions and forms of knowledge (Braithwaite, forthcoming). As such, it can no longer 
be assumed that the ‘subject’ of tax administration is instantly knowable, unified or 
insignificant to processes and outcomes (Taylor, 1998). Rather, we need to appreciate both 
individual knowledge and the structuring principles that this knowledge is part of. 
 
Some of these tenets are arguably encompassed in the ATO Compliance Model. As 
detailed above, the Model seeks to set up a dialogue between taxpayers and tax officers 
that is mutually informative. It aims to effectively communicate complex information that 
taxpayers may not be willing to accept at face value from disembodied and distanced 
sources, either because of suspicion of the Tax Office, the desire to be given a fair hearing, 
or past experiences of bureaucratic incompetence and marginalisation (for example, see 
Peel, 1998; Tyler, 2001). Communication is not incidental to future compliance behaviour 
but fundamentally formative in helping the taxpayer to reach an understanding of their role 
in any tax regime, whilst enabling them to see the human face of the Tax Office that 
respects their individual circumstances and social position. 
 
This is how the ATO Compliance Model is mapped out in theory but how does it function 
in practice? If the argument of this paper is that it is a post-modern tool in a post-modern 
world, then it should be effective at tapping into some of the social relations and conditions 
that help form taxpayers’ practices. The remainder of this paper will show that indeed it is, 
with some notable limitations, an effective compliance tool. This assertion is based on 
interviews carried out with ATO Compliance Model ‘champions’—the people who have 
enthusiastically adopted the Model in their Tax Office outlook and work—with the aim of 
understanding the effect the Model has on tax officers and upon the taxpayers they interact 
with.  
 
 
                                                 
5 For example, Giddens’ work suggests that an institution, such as a university, does not exist independently 
as an over-arching structure that academics and administrators then fit into. Rather, the ways of acting, 
expectations and broader social contexts of the individuals in the university constantly creates and maintains 
the ‘system’ of the university, giving it an appearance of permanence. 
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Research Methods 
 
What are the implications this post-modern ‘take’ for examining tax administration? For 
one, it suggests that individual tax compliance should be researched from ‘the bottom up’, 
working, through dialogue and interaction, from the position and voice of the individual to 
understand their knowledge, and how their practices are formed within social contexts 
(Tyler, 2001). Tax compliance is not just about economics but also about perceptions of 
fairness, equity and citizenship (see Braithwaite et al., 2001)—conceptual ideas that are no 
longer deemed unitary and normatively homogeneous (Beilharz, 2000; Hudson, 2000; 
Turner, 2001) but require further interrogation empirically and theoretically. 
 
As such, this research was carried out using the qualitative methods of one-to-one 
interviews. As the research aimed to understand why and how the ATO Compliance Model 
appealed to champions and how it affected their work, interview methods were deemed 
highly appropriate as they offer the chance for detailed insights into individual 
experiences, views and values. They also present an alternative to more conventional, often 
quantitative, methods of measuring the success of innovations in organisations, being able 
to pick up subtle and ‘below the line’ factors (see Hobson, 2001).  
 
Interviews took place in the spring of 2000. Interviewees were recruited using a ‘snow-
balling’ method. That is, key individuals known to the Tax Office team implementing the 
ATO Compliance Model were interviewed and in the process were asked to recommend 
others who might be willing to talk about the Model, whether their outlook was positive or 
negative. This resulted in 22 Tax Office officers being interviewed (17 male, 5 female)6. 
The managerial scope of interviewees ranged from the most senior levels to APS 6, 
although the majority were clustered around the rank of senior management and top middle 
management.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Interviews were carried out by members of the Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet), Australian 
National University. Interviewers were Brenda Morrison (Centre for Restorative Justice), Tina Murphy 
(Centre for Tax System Integrity) and Declan Roche (Law Programme, now at the London School of 
Economics). 
 14
All interviews were semi-structured, allowing comparative information to be drawn, whilst 
also allowing interviewees the space to talk openly. Some of the questions asked included 
interviewee’s understanding of the Model; any positive and negative experiences they had 
trying to implement the Model in the Tax Office; other Tax Office staff’s understanding 
and support of the Model; and how implementation of the Model might be improved in the 
future. All interviews were taped and transcribed fully. Analysis took the form of ‘open 
coding’. This is a process wherein key themes emerge from the data as the transcripts are 
read, which are then iteratively cross-referenced and built upon through further reading and 
analysis (see Strauss, 1987 for further discussion of this process; see also Hobson, 2001). 
This method enables key themes and sub-themes that were not predetermined before the 
research to be compiled from the data, making it a ‘grounded’ research technique. 
 
Compliance Champions: Working from the inside out 
 
When asked how s/he saw the ATO Compliance Model, one interviewee stated7: 
 
I see the model gives quite clear levels and responses and it lets you take into 
account individual’s personal circumstances, so people at the end of the day feel 
they are being properly treated. They have been listened to, they have had an 
opportunity to debate the issue. At the end of the day they might feel that they don’t 
like the answer but they think they had a proper hearing. So it’s really about an 
individual interacting with the system. Treat them in a professional, personal way, 
but also enable the ATO to understand the various business sectors. 
 
The above quote exemplifies how many ATO Compliance Model champions grasp the 
workings and multiple implications of the Model. Interviewees report how the Model made 
‘intuitive common sense’ to them as it embodies how they feel the Tax Office should be 
working. This modus operandi had previously been constrained by a strong emphasis on 
set structures, hierarchies and processes, which pervaded the organisation and indeed 
institutional management as a whole. As one interviewee puts it: 
 
 
                                                 
7 Interviewee anonymity was an essential part of this research process and therefore the interviewee’s names, 
sex or rank are not identified here. Quotes are taken from the interview transcripts. 
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And the thing that struck me was that, it was funny, but I don’t know what was new 
about it. That was always my attitude, all the way back but I just said ‘right, they 
have finally formalised it and that’s the way to go now’ which is great. Our whole 
team were pretty keen on it.  
 
As such, the ATO Compliance Model appears to challenge previously prevailing Tax 
Office discourses and practices of administering tax law in a pre-determined way. By 
suggesting that there are other ways to be, think and act whilst still achieving compliance, 
opens up both discursive and physical spaces within the organisation where staff can 
legitimately ask new questions and forward new ways of working. One interviewee notes 
that in past times raising the question of the Tax Office’s community legitimacy and moral 
obligations would have been laughable: they were there to collect revenue. Now, the 
Model enables them to ask not only why taxpayers act the way they do but also to ask why 
tax officers act the way they do, and the nature of the relationship between the two. 
 
This presents a different approach to and experience of introducing new ideas into an 
organisation. Rather than CEO led proclamations of ‘where now’ (in comparison to 
Pruzan, 2001), the Model attempts to hand the creative reins to the tax officer, within the 
limits of having to administer a complex tax system. This switch of emphasis can be seen 
as in-keeping with broader changes in business and organisational administration. As 
Hinchliffe (2000, p. 579) summarises: 
 
Hierarchy has been displaced by a taste for heterarchy. Enabling conditions are 
talked about instead of fixed structures. Corporate employees have been dropped in 
preference for enterprising individuals. Movement and initiative have, in some 
quarters, become more valued than stasis and knowing one’s place. 
 
These changes not only concern ways of acting and administering but also the forms of 
knowledge used in the workplace. For example, De Young (1993) draws the distinction 
between tangible and scientific, and intangible and experiential processes of change, 
highlighting how the intangibilities, although highly important, are often ignored in 
research because of their contingent and nebulous nature. Post-modern theory has  
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constantly stressed the vital role of this form of knowledge in social practices and indeed it 
plays a key role for these champions. 
 
This assertion is supported in how the champions talk about the Model. Rather than just 
trying to map it onto their existing work or turn it into a static set of step-by-step 
procedures, it is their ability to ‘play’ with it in their daily routines that makes it work. One 
interviewee described how: 
 
My first reaction was ‘what’s this shit?’ Not in terms of what the Model was trying 
to say, it was just the language, it was in academia. It wasn’t until we started using 
it, when we started playing with some of the ideas in it, that I started to understand 
it. So I guess for a person like me the worst thing to do was to get me to read 
something about it. The first thing to do is not even tell me that there’s a model. Just 
start doing some things. 
 
And indeed many of these champions have indeed started ‘doing some things’ with it. This 
‘playing’ is made possible by champions appearing to internalise the Model, transforming 
it into personal thought processes. Interviewees come to see it as a tool they could use to 
think with, as the quote above shows. Rather than applying it to their work, it has become 
embedded in their thinking. In this way, the ethics of the Model come immediately to the 
fore when considering compliance issues. Post-modern theorists would consider this a 
prime example of self-reflexivity in action, where scientific knowledge gives ways and/or 
combines with experiential knowledge to produce a grounded form of practice (see 
Bogason, 2001). Indeed, interviewees comment that, in fact, they no longer see it as ‘that 
model’ because it has become a way of thinking that pervades their daily routines: 
 
It’s not a model that you can pick off the shelf sometimes and use. It’s more just a 
part of the way we do things. So I think we would consider it to be a success if we 
had all the elements of the model embedded in our work practices without calling it 
a model any more. 
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Indeed, having the space to experiment with the ATO Compliance Model is deemed 
essential to its success as: 
 
People have some resistance to the concept until such time as they personally 
experience it or see the results.  
 
What does the ATO Compliance Model come to represent to these individuals? 
Interviewees call it a philosophy, a framework or a touchstone, which they can use to 
inform their outlook and guide their practices, not only in work but also outside of work. 
For example: 
 
At the end of the day the Compliance Model is really a qualified philosophy, 
principles as to how you want to behave and it gives you the tool in which to react 
to different levels of position of choice. And by having that sort of a positive 
attitude and understanding you will then be able to maximise on relationships, be it 
private, professional or otherwise. 
 
The resonance of the ATO Compliance Model is aided through it fitting with ongoing Tax 
Office discourses about the reshaping the tax system, such as the Taxpayer’s Charter, 
which is concerned with building community confidence and partnerships to increase its 
legitimacy. Thus, the ATO Compliance Model is very much: 
 
In full alignment with the Taxpayers’ Charter. We are clear that we are dealing with 
the individual taxpayer, and the circumstances of taxpayers need to be examined 
and not just put all in one big group and say ‘everything is the same, everything 
applies to that group’. 
 
Thus, the Tax Office is recognising that its institutional authority is no longer enough to 
collect tax effectively. Today, the contestations and recriminations of the taxpayer have to 
be met head on—an argument that many social theorists would agree with. 
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Does the ATO Compliance Model improve tax compliance? 
 
Interviewees report many other positive experiences of the Model. For one, it makes them 
feel that they are part of a global business community, taking part in cutting-edge and 
unusual forms of administrative practices, and thus making them leaders in compliance 
initiatives. The Model also helps to slowly alter the personnel profile of the Tax Office. 
Being able to work with and understand it has become a central part of Tax Office 
recruitment strategies. Interviewees feel that this will eventually help produce an 
organisation able to work effectively with taxpayers, in both building relationships and 
increasing revenue. 
 
However, these champion interviews cannot offer a full picture of how the Model has 
worked within the Tax Office and in the taxpaying community. Many other employees 
have had very different experiences owing to a wide array of factors. For example, other 
CTSI research has pointed out numerous problems ‘rolling out’ the Model, ranging from 
lack of financial and management support in certain business lines to problems with 
interpretations and applicability of the model8 (see Shover et al., 2001). In addition to this 
are the wide-ranging tax reforms in Australia over the proceeding years. This 
administrative upheaval has often obscured and/or obstructed the potential of the ATO 
Compliance Model. Yet, from these interviews it is possible to get an idea of how the ATO 
Compliance Model works when these constraints are not paramount. And overwhelmingly, 
the experiences are positive. 
 
For example, the interviewee below talks about using the Model as an educational tool to 
talk to taxpayers: 
 
When I was doing real time reviews, as part of an explanation to the taxpayer, I 
used to explain the Compliance Model. I’d just draw a little triangle, fairly basic, 
and I explained it from a soft angle to them. And a lot more people after that 
explanation would accept the fact that even if they were audited there’s a reason 
behind it. 
                                                 
8 For example, interviewees commented on how resistance to the Compliance Model was often met from Tax 
Office auditors, who considered the Model as ‘going soft’ on recalcitrant taxpayers. 
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Interviewees report how taxpayers say they feel better informed, more considered and 
more willing/able to comply in the future when tax officers have taken the time to explain 
the Tax Office’s aims and processes, using the Model as a heuristic device. Other 
interviews contain stories of how officers received thank you calls and letters from 
taxpayers after field visits or other interactions. These taxpayers felt that the Tax Office 
was listening and trying to help, not merely trying to catch them out. 
 
Such experiences help interviewees take a longer-term view of taxpayers and their 
relationship with the Tax Office. Whereas past Tax Office emphasis has been on getting as 
much revenue for a financial year, the Model enables champions to see into future years 
and understand how actions today would lead to reactions tomorrow: 
 
We work inside the model. Now, if we interpret the model as one dimension, we 
could have a self-fulfilling prophecy. We prosecute them, they get angry, they don’t 
lodge. It’s a catch-22, it’s a circular argument. So by looking at the compliance 
model a little bit more strategically, you can add that extra dimension. 
 
This is a good example of Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory in practice. That is, to 
understand why particular forms of practice exist, we must look at both the intended and 
unintended consequences of practices. In the past, the Tax Office may have prosecuted to 
increase lodgment but often this makes taxpayers less likely to lodge due to anger and 
resentment. Now, the ATO Compliance Model suggests the Tax Office needs to be aware 
of the future implications of harsh penalties, and thus aim to create a ‘culture’ of 
compliance, not just singular acts of compliance. 
 
The Model also has implications for how tax officers feel about themselves. Many report 
feeling greater pride and having greater productivity since it was introduced, as they too 
now feel more valued by the Tax Office. As one interviewee put it: 
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My observation is that our people feel a greater sense of fulfilment and value 
through management putting faith and confidence in them being involved in the 
decision-making process.  
 
In this sense, the Model makes use of Tax Office staff’s own experiences, knowledge and 
ideas, which are considered so important in the progress of a ‘learning’ organisation (see 
Ali, 2001). 
 
In reference to what the Model comes to represent, some of the ‘problems’ reported by 
interviewees can be seen as the inevitable time delay that occurs when new ways of 
thinking are introduced. This is a measure of how much the Model is challenging the remit 
and practices of the Tax Office, which will take time to change. Indeed, as a result: 
 
We need to break down some of those paradigms and say ‘Well, what does it mean 
for us in the new environment?’ and there needs to be space for that thinking and 
there also needs to be a level of support to take in that work. So I think we’re 
chipping away. 
 
So far, this ‘chipping’ shows encouraging signs of making a real difference not only to 
how the Tax Office operates internally but also its legitimacy as an agency, which is not 
only financially contentious but also publicly manipulated for party political ends. Rather 
than continuing the ‘them and us’ mentality, the ATO Compliance Model offers an 
opportunity for mutual engagement in relation to taxpayer compliance behaviour in a 
globalised world.  
 
Concluding remarks: The cultural politics of compliance behaviour 
 
Post-modern perspectives on social life and human relations stress the role of difference, 
dialogue, positioning, empathy, with institutional knowledge being replaced by 
experiential and local forms of knowledge, to name but a few. Debates continue to rage in 
the academy about whether post-modernism is real or a state of mind/way of seeing the 
world, (see Nash, 2000), and whether a post-modern society necessitates a post-modern 
academy (Bogason, 2001). This paper has not attempted to enter directly into these 
debates. Instead, it has argued that some of post-modernism’s main themes are embodied  
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in the ATO Compliance Model. That is, the Model forwards tax administration practices 
that are interactive and based on affording taxpayers the dignity of assuming they are 
innocent until proven guilty. 
 
In summary, this paper presents two main arguments. First, an initiative like the ATO 
Compliance Model has the potential to increase compliance as it harnesses some of the 
conditions of current social life. For example, rather than looking to make everyone in the 
Tax Office act in the same way, the Model allows difference and replaces it with 
enthusiasm. As one interviewee concisely summarised: 
 
I don’t think you’ll ever get consensus. I think genuine commitment is what I think 
is essential. 
 
In this way, the boundaries between work and home are challenged (see also Nippert-Eng, 
1995), as the Model speaks to the tax officer as a person and a professional, becoming part 
of their ‘worldview’, rather than a piece of black-boxed information (see Latour, 1993). 
This was found to be supported in the interviews, as: 
 
The Compliance Model just made sense of the world where I live. 
 
Secondly, this paper has argued that there is a role for casting a social critical eye over 
topics such as tax compliance, which is usually the domain of positivist disciplines. In 
doing so, a rich area of research is offered up. As the discourse of the citizen-consumer 
limps along, there are strong calls to rather view the relationship between government and 
the public as ‘interactive political engagement’ (Ryan, 2001, p. 105).  
 
Thus, Tomkins et al.’s (2001) assertion that the social factors of globalisation will affect 
compliance may indeed prove true, but questions remain as to why and how these factors 
are effective in relation to the individual taxpayer. Some possible reasons are immediately 
obvious. Information sources such as the Internet provide the chance for individuals to 
learn more about minimising their tax, as aggressive financial services are no longer 
merely the domain of the rich. Also, tax compliance as a political statement is another 
worthy line of inquiry.  
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That is, in the past a few individuals have withheld a proportion of their income tax as 
overt protest to its contribution to funding national armament and nuclear systems. 
Although this may still take place, it is worthwhile asking how the effects of globalisation 
might alter such protests and feelings. As ‘politics’ has seeped into different spaces, such 
as the individual lifestyle, there appears to exist an implicit tension between freedom and 
control in everyday practices. This tension is apparent in some of the normative discourses 
that surround public issues such as tax. For example, whilst citizens of neo-liberal 
government of the UK, US and Australia are (still) experiencing a ‘rolling back of the 
state’, governments have tried to rather regulate social conduct by calling on individuals to 
take on more personal responsibility and act like ‘moral citizens’ (Everingham, 2001; 
Hudson & Kane, 2000). If tax is part of citizenry, and yet the spaces of public citizenry and 
voice are felt to be shrinking or already shrunk (for example see Welcomer, Gioia & 
Kilduff, 2000), withholding tax may be as much a political act as a financial one. Nash 
(2000, 2001) calls this ‘cultural politics’ and Beck calls it ‘sub politics’, in reference to the 
dissolution of the barrier between private and public in modern social life (see also 
Finlayson, 2001). As such, tax compliance is about knowledge, power, values, and also 
about how individuals interact and feel about forms of governance—a way of seeing 
governance and administration that Foucault (1991) called the microphysics of power. 
Therefore, the micro-politics of compliance practices are central to understanding more 
about why and how individuals act the way they do. In light of this argument, there is 
indeed a post-modern agenda of tax research waiting to be undertaken. 
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